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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
THE BOWERY SAVIN GS BANK,
a corporation,

Plaintif{-Respondent,
vs.
LYNN A. JENKINS and
LINDA 1\1. JENKINS, his wife,

Case No.
12903

Defendants-Appellants.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF .THE CASE
This is an action instituted by plaintiff to foreclose
a real estate mortgage because of the defaults of defendants in making the payments required by the note
and mortgage.
DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT
Based upon the pleadings, affidavits and the defendants' answers to written interrogatories, the trial
court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The summary judgment determined the amount
due and owing on the mortgage and ordered that the
mortgage be foreclosed.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-respondent seeks to have the decision of
the lower court affirmed on appeal.

STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
The following are the facts in the case as set forth
m the summary judgment entered by the lower court,
and as established by the pleadings, affidavits and de·
f endants' answers to written interrogatories.
On X O\'emher 7, l!WG, Johnson-Anderson l\Iort·
gage Co. made a mortgage loan to Thomas L. Hoopi·
iaina and Carole Iloopiiaina, his wife. The mortgage
was recorded on N oYember 9, 1966, ancl became a first
lien against the property in question. The note and
mortgage were later sold by J ohnson-.Anclerson l\Iort·
gage Co. to plaintiff-respondent, The Jlowery Sar·
ings Bank, and plaintiff-respondent is now the owner
of the note and mortgage. All these facts were admitted
m defendants' answer to the complaint. (R. 1, 2, 11).
In November of 1970, the Hoopiiainas sold the
property to the defendant-appellants, Lynn A. Jenkins
and Linda l\I. Jen kins, his wife, (hereinafter called the
".Ten kins") ancl a deed was recorded placing record
title in the Jen kins' name. Although the Jenkins claim .
that they sold the property under contract to some pea- ·
ple by the name of Andrus, and that they then sold the
contract to some people by the name of Peterson, no
docwnent was ever recorded indicating that either the
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Anclruses or the Petersons had any interest in the property. (ll. IG, 26, 61) Record title to the property still
stands in the name of Lynn A. Jenkins and Linda M.
Jenkins, his wife. (R. 2,' 11, 59)
The Jenkins failed to make the monthly installment payments which came due on the note and mortgage on June 1st and July 1st, 1971. On July 15th, the
Jenkins tendered the sum of $131.56 to plaintiff, but
this tender was rejected by plaintiff and was returned
by plaintiff to the Jenkins because there was then past
due on the note and mortgage the sum of $261.12. On
,\11gust !5. rnn, the Jenkins tendered the sum of $263.12
to plaintiff, hut this tender was also rejected by plaintiff and was returned by plaintiff to the Jenkins be' «use there was then past due on the note and mortgage
the sum of $389.12. On about September 15, 1971, the
Jenkins tendered the sum of $394.68 to plaintiff, but
this tender was rejected by plaintiff and was returned
by plaintiff to the Jenkins because there was then past
due on the note and mortgage the sum of $526.24. (R.
13, 25, 33, 60)
The plaintiff declared the entire unpaid balance
of the note and mortgage in the sum of $14,635.14 to
be due and payable, and instituted this action to foreclose the mortgage. ( R. 34, 35, 36) Thereafter the
Jenkins tendered the sum of $526.24 to plaintiff. This
tender was rejected by plaintiff and was returned by
plaintiff to the Jenkins because the entire unpaid bal-
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ance of the mortgage in the sum of $14,635.64 had a].
ready been declared due and payable, because no sumi
had ever been tendered by certified check as previouslv
requirecl in a written notice to the .Jenkins as a condi.
tion to reinstating the delinquent account, and because
said sum was insufficient to bring the delinquenciei
current and pay the costs and attorneys' fees already in·
curred by the plaintiff in the action. (R. 34, 60, 61)
The unpaid principal balance of the note ana
mortgage is $14,635.64, and said sum bears interest at
6% per annum from l\Iay 1, 1971, the last date that
any payment was received by plaintiff and applied on
the loan. This amount is not disputed by defendant-appellants. (R. 34, 61)

ARGUl\IENT
POINT I

SUl\11\IARY JUDGl\IE:NT 'VAS PROPERLY GRANTED SINCE THERE
AS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO
ANY l\IATERIAL FACT.

''r

In Point I of their brief the appellants argue that
summary judgment was improperly granted since gen·
uine issues of material fact existed concerning tenders
of delinquent payments.
The respondent agrees with appellants that sum·
mary judgment cannot be granted if material factual
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issues concerning tender exist. In fact, however, there
was no factual issue whatsoever concerning the alleged
te!lllers in this case. The dates and amounts of each
tender as alleged by appellants are identical to the dates
and amounts of each tender as set forth in the respondents' affidavit in support of its motion for summary
judgment. (Compare the dates and amounts of each
such tender as set forth by appellants in their answers
to written interrogatories (A. 25-26) with the dates
and amounts of each tender as alleged in plaintiff's
afl'idaYit.) ( R. 33-34) These facts concerning each such
tender, as established and agreed upon by appellants'
answers to interrogatories and respondents' affidavit,
were the exact facts as found by the lower court and
set forth by the lower court in the summary judgment.
(R. 60-Gl)

There was no factual dispute concerning the alleged
tenders by appellants. The only dispute was as to the
legal effect of these alleged tenders. This was a question of law, and, as pointed out in Point II of this brief,
the lower court ruled correctly insofar as this legal question was concerned.
POINT II
THE VARIOUS ALLEGED TENDERS
OF DELINQUENT P AYl\IENTS BY
APPELLANTS WERE ALL INSUFFICIENT AND INADEQUATE AND
DID NOT PREVENT PLAINTIFF
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GAGE.

FORECLOSING THE :MORT-

In their answer the appellants admitted the execu
tion of the note and mortgage which are the suhjectoi
this aetion. They a<lmittecl that the mortgage was
erly recorded arnl Le came a valid first lien against tn1
property in question. They admitted that the note anu
mortgage are now held and owned by respondent ana
that appellants are now the record owners of the
erty. (R. l, 2, 11) The present unpaid principal bal·
ance of the note awl mortgage, paying interest to
l, rn71, was estahlishecl as being $14,G35.G4, by appel·
lants' answers to interrogatory No. 2 ( R. 16, 26) ana
by the uncontraclictccl affolavit attache<l to resp@
dent's motion for summary judgment. ( R. 34).
The appellants also admitted to defaulting in their
payments 011 the note and mortgage. (R. 13, 56) The)'
contend, however, that they tendered the delinquent in·
stallrnents to plaintiff-respondent, and that thf·ir ten·
ders prevented plaintiff-respondent from foreclosing
the mortgage.

It is respondent's contention that each and ever)'
tender was insufficient, was returned immediately to
defendant-a ppcllants, and that the defective and insuf·
ficient tenders could not prevent foreclosure. The facts
concerning the alleged tenders are established by dt
fendant-appellants' answers, and answers to
tories, and by the affidavit filed in support of plaw·
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tiff's motion for summary judgment. (R. 13, 25-26, 333(i) These facts may be summarized as follows:
The Jen kins defaulted in making their June 1,
1971 and .July 1, 1971 payments on the note and mortgage. Suhsec1uent to July 15, 1971, plaintiff-respondent
receive<l a check from the Jenkins in the sum of $131.56.
This check was immediately returned by plaintiff-respondent to the Jenkins, because there was then due
and owing on the mortgage the sum of $261.12.
Three weeks passed before plaintiff-respondent
heard anything further from the Jenkins. Then, subsequent to August 5, 1971, plaintiff-respondent received
checks from the .T enkins in the sum of $263.12. These
checks were mailed hack to the Jen kins on August 9,
Hl71, and the Jen kins were notified in writing that the
checks were being returned because there was then due
and owing on the mortgage, the sum of $389.12. The
transmittal letter also notified the Jenkins that notice
of default had been filed concerning the loan, and that
before p la inti ff-respondent would even consider reins ta ting the loan, the Jen kins would have to personally
contaet plaintiff's agent. (R. 35)
The Jenkins ignored the letter for six weeks. Then
on about September 15, 1971, plaintiff-respondent received checks from the Jenkins in the sum of $394.68.
These checks were returned to the Jenkins by letter of
September 16, 1971. This letter informed the Jenkins
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that there was then clue and owing on the mortgage !ht
sum of
It further stated that notice of default
had already been filed concerning the loan, and that
reinstatement would be considered unless all delinquenl
installments were paid by certified check and unh
the Jen kins contacted the collection manager. (R. 36)
On September 23, rnn, Jenkins called the collec·
tion mmw.ger to discuss reinstatement of the loan anJ
was told by the manager that foreclosure proceedingi
were underway. Action to foreclose the mortgage wai
instituted on September 24, I !l71, by the filing of thi
complaint in this action. Thereafter, plaintiff-responden!
received checks from the .Ten kins in the sum of $526.21.
The checks were not certified as required by the nofo
sent to the Jen kins on September 16th. These checki
immediately returned to the Jenkins.
The fore going facts establish that the allegen
"tenders., of the Jen kins were at all times insufficient
and inadequate and constituted. no defense to the action.
It is a basic rule of law that a tender in order to have
any legal effect must be sufficient to cover all sums
which are then due to the creditor. As stated in 86 C.J.S.
§ 7 Tender:
"In order to constitute a· valid tender, the
tenderer must of fer a specific amount. '¥bile
such amount need not be beyond reasonable
dispute, nothing short of an offer of everything
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that the creditor is entitled to receive is sufficient, and a debtor must at his peril tender
the entire sum due, including all necessary
expenses incurred or' damages suffered bv the
creditor by reason of the default of the debtor,
aml a mistake in tendering an amount less
than the sum due is the misfortune of the
tenderer, the tender having no legal significance if refused, and the position of the parties
remains the same as though no tender had been
made."
The defendants' first tender of $131.56 was made
at a time when there was $261.12 owed on the note and
mortgage. This tender was insufficient in amount and
had no legal effect.
The defendants' second tender of $263.12 was made
at a time when there was $3'1,Jaowed on the note and
mortgage. This tender was insufficient in amount and
had no legal effect.
The defendants' third tender of $394.68 was made
at a time when there was $522.24 owed on the note and
mortgage and was made after the defendants had been
informed in writing that notice of default had been
filed concerning the loan and that reinstatement of the
loan would not be considered unless certain conditions
Were fulfilled.
The defendants' fourth tender of $526.24 was not
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made until after defendants had received a second writ.
ten notice that notice of default had been filed concern
ing the loan and that reinstatement would not be con·
sidcrcd unless certain conditions were fulfilled. The
$.'52G.24 was not received by plaintiff-respondent until
after suit had been instituted and until after plaintiff.
respondent had incurred costs and attorneys' fees in
the institution of the action.
The defendant-appellants assert in Point II of
their brief that they had a right to bring all delinquent
installments current and luwe the loan reinstated at any
time prior to service of summons upon them. This is not
the law.
The general rule is that a mortgagee need only take
some affirmati,·e act which clearly evidences its in·
tention to accelerate the mortgage. After such act has
heen take11 the debtor

JJO

longer has the right to tender

delinc1uent payments all<l thereby prevent foreclosure.
As stated in

;)5

Am J ur 2d, l\Iortgages § 390:

"The exercise of an option to declare due
the entire debt secured by a mortgage is generally rcgarcled as terminating the right of the
mortgagor to compel the acceptance by the
mortO'ao·ce
of the defaulted ohliiration merely.
h
h
Under this rule it is held that the exercise of
an option to accelerate a mortgage is not affected by a subsequent tender of arrears even
u
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if such tender is made before foreclosure of
the mortgage."
The rule is stated as follows in 59 C.J.S., Mortgages § 4!)5 ( G) ( b) at page 797:
"A tender before the commencement of
foreclosure action but after election to accelerate does not bar acceleration, nor does a tender
a f tcr foreclosure action is commenced. A tender
of less than the full amount due is likewise insufficient .... "
Various acts have been held sufficient as evidencing a creditor's election to have the entire debt paid,
thereby cutting off the debtor's right to have the loan
reinstated by the tender of delinquent installments.
Such acts have included the creditor listing the entire
irn1ebteclness as immediately due and payable on his
books (1Volflcy v. JVooten, 220 Mo. App. 668, 293
S. \V. 7:J) ; presentment of a claim to the debtor's administrator as a mature debt (Burk v. Guilford "IJlortgage Co., Tex. Civ. App. 161 S.W.2d 574); the filing
of a suit by the creditor (Stewart v. Thomas, Tex. Civ.
App. 170 S.,V. 886) the sending of a demand letter
to the debtor by the creditor's attorney which included
a statement of the total sum due (Thompson v. 1Villson,
183 1\Iisc. 94!), 51 N.Y.S.2d 665). Plaintiff-respondent
is aware of no case which has held that a debtor has a
right to reinstate a delinquent loan until after he has
been served with summons.
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The law in Utah, as in most other jurisdictions
is that a de faulting debtor need not even be given notic;
of the creditor's election. As stated by the Utah Supreme
Court in Thomas v. Foulger, 71 Utah 274, 264 Pac,
975, 978:
"According to the great weight of authority, when a note contains a provision accelerating the date of maturity if the interest is not
paid "\vhen due, the holder of such note is not
required to give notice of an election to declare
the note due as a condition precedent to bringing an action for its collection."
Although the plaintiff-respondent was not required
to give notice to the J cnkins, it did, in fact, give two
written notices to them. Both of these notices were given
prior to the time the Jenkins made any pretext at ten·
clering all of the delinquent installments then due under
the mortgage.
The first notice was given on August !J, 1971, after
the Jen kins had tendered the sum of $263.12 to plain·
tiff-respondent. This notice stated that the $2G3.12 was
being returned to the Jen kins because there was then
due and owing on the mortgage the sum of $389.12. It
notified them that notice of default had already been
filed concerning the loan and that reinstatement of the
loan would not even be considered until after the Jenkins
had contacted the office.
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The second notice was given on September 16, 1971,
after the .Jen kins had again made an insufficient tender,
this time in the sum of $394.68. This notice stated that
the $3!H.G8 was being reforned to the .Jenkins and that
the amount clue and owing was $526.24. It again informed the .Jenkins that notice of default had been filed
concerning the loan and that reinstatement of the loan
would not even be considered until after the Jenkins
ha<l contacted the collection manager and had submitted
all delinquent amounts by certified check. As previously mentioned, no certified check was ever tendered to
plaintiff-respondent.
The instant case is very similar to the recent Utah
case of A mcrican Savings & Loan Association v. Blom·
quist, 21 U.2d 289, 445 P.2d I (1968). In that case, the
defendants executed and delivered to plaintiff a promissory note awl mortgage, which were apparently identical in all material respects with the note and mortgage
involved in the case now before this Court. In that case,
as in the instant case, the defendants were consistently
late in making their payments. On December 14, 1964,
the plaintiff sent a letter to defendants which demanded
the payment of $149.00 for the November 15, 1964 installment; delinquencies in prior payments of $22.00;
and 14 unpaid late charges totalling $83.16. The letter
stated that plaintiff would not accept any partial payment of the sums then due and that if payment were
remitted after December 25th, it should also include
the December 15th installment payment.
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In that case, as in the instant case, the defendanli
sent a check which was insufficient to pay the amoun:
then due. In that case, as in the instant case, the checl
was returned to defendants and defendants were
ferred to plaintiff's letter of December 14th.
On .January nth, another check was sent to plaintiff
by defendants, which check \vas also insufficient to pa!
the amount then due. As in the instant case this checl
was returned by plaintiff to defendants. The
tal letter statccl that def cndants must immediately pa)
the srnns ref erred to in the letter of December I4t\1,
l>lus the Deecmhcr installment
\Vhen the de·
fondants resubmitted this same cheek to plaintiff, tne
plaintiff returned it with a letter whieh stated thal
plaintiff was going to aceeleratc the debt and whichgare
defendants 30 days within which to pay off the loan.
The trial court in thn t case gave summary judg·
rnent for the plaintiff, as did the trial court in the in·
stant case. On appeal the decision \\'aS affirmed. The
Supreme Court rejected the defendants' contention that
the notice to defendants was inadequate. The Court
held:
"13y the letters of December 14 and 28
and January (), the respondent unequivocally
demanded strict performance and rejected appellants' response thereto with a check of $147
as an inadequate tender. From all the surrounding facts and circumstances there is no
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evidentiary basis to hold that the trial court
erre<l in its <letermination that appellants were
given a<lcquate notice and a reasonable time to
,,
comp 1y.
In the instant case the plaintiff-respondent at all
times <lemarnled strict performance and rejected each
and every inadequate tender by immediately returning
each such tender to defendants. The defendants were
given two written notices that notice of default had
been filed concerning the loan and that plaintiff-respondent would not even consider reinstating the loan
unless certain conditions were complied with. The .trial
court di<l not e1T in its determination that plaintiff was
entitled to summary judgment.
POINT III
THE PLAINTIFF vV AS NOT REQUIRED TO J 0 I N AS A DEFENDANT ANY PERSON WHOSE
INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY DID
NOT APPEAR OF RECORD AT THE
T Il\I E THE SUIT WAS INSTITUTED.
In Point III of their brief, the Jenkins urge that
plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed for failure to
join certain "indispensable parties" as defendants to the
action. The Jenkins claim that these "indispensable parties" are the "Andruses", who are allegedly purchasing
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the property from the Jenkins under an unrecorden
real estate contract ancl the "Petersons", who are a!.
legedly the owners of the property under some type ol
llllreconle<l co1neyance from the Jen kins. The .J enkin1
admitted in their answers to interrogatories that neither
the alleged contract, nor the alleged deed, nor any other
instrument referring to the conrtact or the deed nor
instrument of any type referring to the Andruses or
the Petersons has ever been recorded with the Salt Lake
County Recorder. (R. 16, 26).
Under these circmnstances, the Jenkins were the
only necessary parties defendant to the action since the)
were the only persons shown by the records of the
County Reconler to have any interest in the property,
Section 78-:}7-:3, Utah Code Annotated 1!)53, dealini
with necessary parties in mortgage foreclosure proceed·
mgs, states, as follows:

Necessary parties-U nrccord·
cd rights barrcd.-N o person holding a conveyance from or under the mortgagor of the property mortgaged, or lutYing a lien thereon, which
conveyance or lien does not appear of record
in the proper office at the time of the commencement of the action, need be made a party
to such action, and the judgment therein rendered, and the proceedings therein had, are as
conclusive against the party holding such unrecorded conveyance or lien as if he had been
made a party to the action."
"78-37-3.
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In construing this section, the Utah Supreme Court
helcl in the case of Gigliotti v. Albergo, 115 P.2d 791,
100 Utah
(rn41), that where deeds were given by
the mortgagors covering 'the real property, the grantee
in the deeds acquired no interest in the property which
would be superior to the mortgage, or which would require the grantee to be made a party to the mortgage
foreclosure action, where the deed to the grantee was
unrecorded at the time the mortgage foreclosure action
was instituted.
The Gigliotti case is identical to the case now before this court. The Jenkins could not create any interest
in the Petersons or the Andruses which would have any
priority over the plaintiff's mortgage. Since no document was ever recorded granting any interest to the
Petersons or the Andruses, ·Section 78-37-3 controlled
and they were not necessary parties to the action.
The exclusive test as to whether a person need be
made a party to a foreclosure action is whether a conve»ance to that person appears of record in the office
of the proper county recorder at the time the foreclosure action is commenced. (See Redondo Improve·
mcnt Co. 1i. ()'Shaughnessy, 168 Cal. 323, 143 Pac.
538). It is completely immaterial whether the mortgagee
ha<l actual knowledge of the existence of an unrecorded
conveyance. He need only join those persons who have
a recorded interest. In the case of Hager v. Astorg, 145
Cal. 548, 79 Pac. 68, the California Supreme Court
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construed a provision of the California Code of
Procedure which is identical to Section 78-37-3 of tn
Utah Code. The Court stated:
". . . . 'Vhen the foreclosure proceedings
were commenced, the conveyance from l\I.
Astorg to A. Astorg had not been recorded,
and "·as not recorded until after the decree of
foreclosure had been entered. Appellant set
up these facts in his answer, and further
averred that plaintiff, at the time she commenced her action of foreclosure, knew that
the conveyance of the premises had been made
by l\I. Astorg to him, and that he was then sole
owner, but that she failed to make him a party
defendant in the foreclosure proceedings. Upon
the trial appellant sought to make proof of
this knowledge of plaintiff of the existence
of the conveyance to him when she filed her
complaint to foreclose, but on objection of the
respondent the court clecided that this evidence was inadmissible, and whether the ruling
of the court was correct or not is the important
question to he now determined.
The lower court was undoubtedly of the opinion that, as the conveyance to the appellant was
not recorded when the foreclosure proceedings
were commenced, it was immaterial whether
plaintiff had actual knowledge of its existence
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or not; that she was required to make those
persons defendants only whose conveyances appeared of record at the time she instituted her
foreclosure suit. We are satisfied that this view
was correct urnler the Code and the authorities.
It is provided by section 726 of the Code of
Civil Procedure that: "No person holding a
conveyance from or under the mortgagor of
the property mortgaged, ... which conveyance
... does not appear of record in the proper
office at the time of the commencement of the
action, need be made a party to such action;
and the judgment therein rendered, and the.
proceedings therein had, are as conclusive
against the party holding such unrecorded conveyance ... as if he had been made a party to
the action." The language of this section is not
open to construction. It plainly declares that
it is unnecessary to make any person a party
to an action of foreclosure, whose conveyance
from the mortgagor, subsequent to the mortgage, is unrecorded at the time the action is
eonunenced, while at the same time it binds
such person by the decree in the action as conclusively as though he had in fact been made a
party to the suit. The element of actual knowledge of the existence of such conveyance, in
the absence of its recordation, is not within the
terms of the section. The presence or absence
of the subsequent conveyance upon the record
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m the proper office when the action is commenced is the exclusiYe test as to whether the
holder thereof need or need not he made a party
defendant, so as to hind him by the foreclosure
decree. This is the only test in foreclosure proceedings which the law furnishes, and under the
sedion abo,·e quoted it is not necessary to
make such holder of an unrecorded conveyance
a party defendant, eYen though the mortgagor
may have actual knowledge of the existence of
such conyeyance when the foreclosure suit is
commence<l. He need only look to the appropriate records, and make parties to the action
those alone whose subsequent conYeyances appear thereon.
In Point I II of their brief the defendant-appel·
lants cite f'iye cases which they claim support their argu·
ment that the Petersons and Andruses are necessaf)'
parties to this action. A cursory reading of those case)
shows that none of them support defendant-appellants'
position or in any manner alters the clear and unambig·
uous directive of Section 78-37-3.
The first of the cases cited by defendant-appel·
lants in .loh 11sun 7.'. I-I ome On.:11crs Loan Corporation,
Cal. A pp.2d 546, 116 P .2d 167. In that case a deed tc
the appellant was recorded prior to the time foreclosure
proceedings were instituted, and appellant was const
quently held to be a necessary party to the foreclosure
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action. !lather than supporting defendant-appellants'
argument, this case supports the proposition that only
those who have an interest of record need be made parties
to a mortgage foreclosm:e action. This case reaffirmed
all of the prior California decisions on this point, including the Hnp;er v. Astorg and the Redondo Improve·
mcnt Co. v. O'Shaughnessy cases, supra. In the course
of its opinion the Court stated at page 169:
"As pointed out by appellant, we are not
here dealing with a person holding a conveyance from or under the mortgagor which conveyance is not of record. The grant deed in the.
instant case was duly recorded." (Emphasis
is that of the California Court.)
The second case cited by defendant-appellants is
Federal Land Ban/,; of Berldey v. Pace, 87 Utah 156,
48 P.2d 480 ( 1935). This was not a mortgage foreclosure action, but was an action brought to quiet title
to a strip of land which a mortgagee had negilgently
failed to include in the mortgage. Had it been a mortgage foreclosure action, only those who had a recorded
interest in the property would have had to have been
made parties to the action. This distinction was pointed
out by the Utah Supreme Court at page 483 as follows:
" .... The plaintiff proceeds on the assumption that section 104-55-3 R. S. Utah 1933
( 78-37-3) does not compel him to join as defendants in a suit to reform a mortgage or for
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specific performance those parties who have not
their cmweyance of reconl. In this he is in
error. That section provides that no person
holding a conveyance from or under the mortgagor of the property mortgaged, or having a
lien thereon, which crnweyance or lien does not
appear of record in the proper office, need be
made a party. hut it does not go to the extent
of saying that, where one is required to resort
to the courts in onler to have a mortgage made,
all parties interested in the land, in order to be
hound by a decree in such case, must not be
made parties. Section 104-55-3 has nothing to
do with a situation where parties must resort to
the courts in order to obtain the mortgage.
The case now before this Court is not one to creatt
a mortgage. It is an action to foreclose a mortgage,

and, as stated in the Federal Land Bank of
case, section 78-37-3 applies.
The next case cited by defendant-appellants i1
11lickclson v. Anderson, 81 Utah 444, 19 P.2d ioai
( 1932). This case has no application to the instant case.
In the 11lickclson case, the defendant Anderson who wai
the record title owner of the property and whose deeo
had been properly recorded prior to the institution
the action, was inadvertently omitted as a defendant Jll
the foreclosure proceedings. Her interest was recorded
and Section 78-:37-3 would require her to be made i
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party. These facts were set forth by the Utah Supreme
Court at page 1034, as follows:
" ... on l\larch 20, 1,927, Ida Burge conveyed
to Vivian Anderson; that the mortgage imd
all these corweyances were duly recorded; that
prior to hringing the foreclosure suit plaintiff
had caused an abstract of title to be prepared,
hut the abstractor had omitted therefrom the
record of the conveyance from Ida Burge to
Yivian Anderson, and by reason thereof Vivian
Amlerson, the then owner of the mortgaged
property, was not included as a defendant in
the foreclosure action; . . ."
The Mickelson case did not involve the question of
whether one whose interest was not of record should be
made a party to a mortgage foreclosure action and this
question was not even mentioned by the Court.
Very little need be said about the next case cited
hy defendant-appellants, lloyt v. Upper "ftlarion Ditch
Co., !lJ. Utah 134, 76 P.2d 234 (1938). This case did
not even invoke a real estate mortgage. Accordingly
section 78-37-3 was not involved and was not even mentione<l by the Court. The II oyt case involved a pledge
of stock, and there is not Utah statute involving pledges
which in any manner corresponds to Section 78-37-3.
It is impossible to see even the remotest connection between the II oyt case and the instant action.
The last case cited by defendant-appellants is
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Reader v. District Court of the Fourth Judicial Distrir1
!l8 Utah I, 94 P.2d 858 (1D33). In this case serviceu
sun1111ons was attempted on a corporate mortgagor whii
was the reconl title owner of the property in question
Seniee of summons on the corporation was clefecti1
and the court therefore held that it had never been ma1[1
a party to the action. Since the party having record
title was not made a party to the action, the foreclosun
judgment was n>icl. This case is in full conformity will
the literal wording of Section 78-37-3. It holds that on,
having a recordecl interest in the mortgaged prope11yi·
a necessary party to a mortgage foreclosure action. Tn1
case docs not state that someone having an unrecordec
interest in the property should also be made a party \1
the action. That proposition was not even mentioned il
the case.
,
1

X one of the cases cited by def endant-appellan\1
intimate, even by way of dicta, that a holder of an un·
recorded interest in real property should he made a parli
to a mortgage foreclosure action. The clear and un·
ambiguous language of Section 78-37-3 is that "Xe
person holding a conveyance ... which conveyance···
docs not appear of record ... need be made a party to
such action ... "

The reason the Utah legislature enacted Section
78-:37-3 is obvious when one considers the
scheme developed in this state to assure uncomplicatea
alienahility of real property and to give assurance to
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purchasers of real property concerning their titles. Under this statutory scheme a prospective purchaser is on
notice of the claim of any person whose interest in real
property is recorded in the office of the proper County
Recorder. He knows that he must obtain releases or
conveyances from all such persons in order to obtain
free and unencumbered title. If he obtains such releases and convey.ances from all persons having such
recorded interests, he can be assured that his title to
the property is clear. No person who holds an unrecorded
interest in the property of whom the purchaser had no
actual knowledge can later appear and claim superior
title to the property in question.
·
The purpose of Section 78-37-3 is to give similar
assurance to the prospective purchasers at mortgage
foreclosure sales, and to give similar stability to land
titles derived from sheriff's deed emanating from such
sales. A prospective purchaser may be willing to bid a
substantial amount for a parcel of real property at a
mortgage foreclosure sale where he has checked the reconls of the appropriate county recorder and determined
that all persons who had an interest of record in the
property were made parties to the foreclosure action
and are thereby bound by the foreclosure decree. Section 78-37-3 gives him the assurance that no one unknown
to him, who holds an interest in the property under an
unrecorded deed or contract of sale, can later assert a
claim to the property on the grounds that the existence
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of such unrecorded deed or contract was known to the
mortgagor or mortgagee.
\Tithout the assurance prmrided by Section 78-37-8,
a prospective purchaser at a sheriff's sale would be
willing to bid ve1y little for the property in question.
Construction of Section 78-37-3 in the manner urged
by defendant-appellants would be disastrous for mort·
gagees since they would be able to receive only a fraction
of the value of their security on foreclosure sale of the
property. It would be disastrous for mortgagors since
the resulting low bid for the property at a sheriff's sale
would correspondingly increase the amount of the deficiency judgment entered against them. It would be
t'or any person now owning real property
where title was derived from a sheriff's deed, since
title to his property would be forever questioned.
\

1

The plain and unambiguous language of Section
78-37-3 must not be twisted and tortured in the manner
urged by defendant-appellants. To do so would result
in the consequences envisioned by Justice 1Volfe in the

Hoyt case:
"The security holder cannot reasonably
exhaust the security if at the foreclosure sale
no one would buy it because no one could get
a title which would be worth paying 10 cents
for ... " p. 240
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CONCLUSION
All of the material facts in this case were estabthemselves in their anlished by clef
swer to the complaint and their answers to written interrogatories. These documents established that defendant-appellants were continually delinquent in their
payments under the note and mortgage. They made
several insufficient tenders to plaintiff-respondent, one
of $131.56 when there was $261.12 due and owing; one
of $263.12 when there was $389.12 due and owing; and
one of $394.68 w·hcn there was $526.24 due and owing.
All tenders were rejected and immediately returned
by plaintiff-respondent to defendant-appellants. ·
It is further established that on two occasions prior
to the time 1lefendant-rcspondents made any attempt at
tendering the full delinquency, the plaintiff-respondent
no i r·;,... 1 ·le f'en'lant-armellants, in ·writing, that notice
of default had been filed concerning the loan and that
reinstatement would not be considered unless certain conditions were complied with. Defendant-appellants ignored these two notices the same way they had continuously ignored their payment obligations under the
note and mortgage. The facts as established led inexorably to the legal conclusion that all of the alleged
tenders were at all times insufficient and inadequate
and did not prevent foreclosure of the mortgage.

The answers of defendant-appellants to plaintiff's
complaint admitted that defendant appellants were the
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owners of the property as shown by the records of the
County Hecorder. Their answers to written interroga.
tories admitted that no document was ever recorded
showing any interest in the property in either the "An·
druscs" or the "Petersons". Section 78-37-3, Utah Code
Annotated declares without equivocation that under
these circumstances the defendant-appellants were the
only necessary defendants to the action and that neither
the "Andruses" nor the "Petersons" were necessary
parties.
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of
the trial court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submittted,
Roger J. :McDonough

JONES, \VALDO, HOLBROOK
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